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BUCHANAN v. ANGELONE
118 S.Ct. 757 (1998)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
On the afternoon of September 15, 1987, Douglas
McArthur Buchanan, Jr. took a rifle to his father's house.
Buchanan argued with his father about his natural mother's
death from breast cancer.As the argument became more heat-
ed, Buchanan shot his father in the back of the head, killing him
instantly. Following the shooting of his father, Buchanan
remained at his father's house. When his two half-brothers
returned from school, Buchanan shot them both. One died from
the gunshot wound; Buchanan killed the other with a kitchen
knife. Buchanan remained in his father's house, waiting for his
stepmother to return from work.When she arrived, Buchanan
stabbed her to death with a kitchen knife.'
Buchanan was convicted in the Circuit Court ofAmherst
County of the capital murder of more than one person as
part of the same act or transaction.2 At the penalty phase of
Buchanan's trial, the prosecutor told the jury that he was
seeking the death penalty on the basis of Virginia's"vileness"
aggravator3 The prosecutor conceded that Buchanan had a
troubled childhood, but informed the jury that it was its
responsibility to weigh the factors in Buchanan's favor
against the crime he committed. 4 Defense counsel, in his
opening statement, outlined the mitigating evidence he
would present and asked that, on the basis of that evidence,
Buchanan not be sentenced to death.'
Over the next two days, the defense presented seven
witnesses in mitigation. These witnesses recounted the
early death of Buchanan's natural mother from breast
cancer, his father's subsequent remarriage, and the
attempts of Buchanan's father and stepmother to keep
him from seeing his maternal relatives. 6 These factors, a
psychiatrist testified, caused Buchanan to be under
"extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the
crime 17 The prosecution presented a total of eight wit-
'Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389,394-95, 384 S.E.2d
757, 760-61 (1989). See also, Case Summary of Buchanan v.
Angelone, 103 E3d 344 (4th Cir. 1996), Cap. Def J.,Vol. 9, No. 2, p. 29.
2Buchanan v. Angelone, 118 S.Ct. 757, 759 (1998). See VA.
CODE § 18.2-31(7) (1996).





TBuchanan, 118 S.Ct. at 759. "Extreme ... emotional distur-
bance" is one of the mitigating factors explicitly recognized by the
Commonwealth of Virginia.Va. Code § 19.2-264.4(B)(ii) (1995).
"Under Virginia Code Section 19.2-264.4, the prosecution has
the burden of proving either vileness or future dangerousness
beyond a reasonable doubt.
nesses to prove the vileness aggravator and contradict
Buchanan's mitigation witnesses.9
In their dosing arguments in the penalty phase, both the pros-
ecutor and defense counsel discussed the existence of the mitiga-
tion evidence and the weight it should be given in the jury's delib-
erations.The prosecutor told the jury that "even if you find that
there was vileness [ ] you do not have to return the death sen-
tence. 10°This comment implicitly refers to the mitigating evidence
presented by the defense. Defense counsel explained the concept
of mitigation in general and the specific mitigating factors operative
in Buchanan's case. Counsel discussed in detail Buchanan's lack of
"prior criminal activity," his "extreme ... emotional disturbance at
the time of the offense,"his significantly reduced capacity to "appre-
date the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
the law's requirements" and Buchanan's'"youth:7"
Neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel objected
to the jury being instructed using Virginia's pattern capital
sentencing instruction"2 which did not make any mention
9Buchanan, 118 S.Ct. at 759. Among the eight witnesses
called by the prosecution were two mental health experts who
agreed with the defense's expert regarding the factual events of
Buchanan's life, but disagreed with their effect on his commission
of the crimes. Id1
IOd
"Id. Each of these mitigating factors is explicitly stated in
Virginia Code Section 19.2- 264.4(B)(i), (ii), (iv), and (v), respec-
tively.Also listed in the statute as mitigating factors are "(ili) [that]
the victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or con-
sented to the act" and "(vi) mental retardation of the defendant.'
The statute makes clear, however, that mitigating evidence "shall
not be limited to" the six factors listed. Mitigating evidence can
include any evidence that is relevant and defense counsel should
not feel constrained by the statute as to what types of evidence
can be used in mitigation.
'2Buchanan, 118 S.Ct. at 759.The complete instruction was as
follows:
[1] You have convicted the Defendant of an offense which may
be punishable by death.You must decide whether the defen-
dant should be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment
[2] Before the penalty can be fixed at death, the
Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
his conduct in committing the murders of Douglas McArthur
Buchanan, Sr., Christopher Donald Buchanan, Joel Jerry
Buchanan and Geraldine Patterson Buchanan, or any one of
them, was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhu-
man, in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or aggra-
vated battery to the above four victims, or to any one of them.
[3] If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth
has proved beyond a reasonable doubt the requirements
of the preceding paragraph, then you may fix the punish-
ment of the Defendant at death or if you believe from all
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of mitigation evidence. 3 Defense counsel requested sev-
eral additional jury instructions, including four instructions
on particular statutory mitigating factors. 4 Each of these
instructions stated, basically, that "if the jury found the fac-
tor to exist,'then that is a fact that mitigates against impos-
ing the death penalty, and [the jury] shall consider that fact
in deciding whether to impose a sentence of death or life
imprisonment.'"'" Buchanan also proposed a more general
mitigation instruction which stated that, "In addition to the
mitigating factors specified in other instructions, [the jury]
shall consider the circumstances surrounding the offense,
the history and background of [Buchanan] and any other
facts in mitigation of the offense." 6 The trial court refused
to give any of these requested instructions.
7
The jury returned with a unanimous verdict in favor of
the death penalty'8 and the trial court sentenced Buchanan to
death.'9 On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed Buchanan's conviction and sentence. 0 Buchanan
subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
the United States District Court of the Western District of
Virginia. The district court denied the petition. The United
the evidence that the death penalty is not justified, then
you shall fix the punishment at life imprisonment.
[4] If the Commonwealth has failed to prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt the requirements of the second paragraph
in this instruction, then you shall fix the punishment of
the defendant at life imprisonment.
[51 In order to return a sentence of death, all twelve jurors
must unanimously agree on that sentence. Id at 763-764.
The third paragraph of the instruction, especially the "from all
the evidence" language, was pivotal in the Court's decision.
"In 1995 Virginia amended its pattern capital sentencing
instructions to add an instruction on mitigating evidence. This
instruction requires the jury to consider "any evidence presented
of circumstances which do not justify or excuse the offense but
which in fairness or mercy may extenuate or reduce the degree of
moral culpability and punishment" Virginia Model Jury
Instructions, Criminal, Instruction No. 34.127 (1993 and Supp.
1995). The basic model capital sentencing instruction, however,
remains the same as the one given at Buchanan's trial. See supra
note 12 and Virginia Model Jury Instructions, Criminal, Instruction
No. 34.125 (1993 and Supp. 1995). Justice Breyer's statement in
Buchanan that Virginia had amended its actual capital sentencing
instruction was thus not entirely accurate. Buchanan, 118 S.Ct. at
765 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Not all compilers of jury instructions,
however, have noted the Commonwealth's addition of the miti-
gating evidence instruction. See Instructions for Virginia and West
Virginia, Fourth Edition, Vol. 2A, p. 105, § 24-181 Capital Murder
(1996 and Supp. 1998) (instruction substantially identical to
instruction given in note 12, supra, using "all the evidence" lan-
guage and no mitigating evidence instruction).
"Buchanan, 118 S.Ct. at 760. Defense counsel requested
instructions on the following statutory mitigating factors: absence
of prior criminal activity; extreme mental or emotional disturbance;
significantly impaired capacity to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of law; and
youth. Id See Va. Code § 19.2-264.4(B)(i), (ii), (iv), and (v) (1995).




States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.2' The
Supreme Court of the United States granted Buchanan's peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari."
HOLDING
The Supreme Court of the United States, in an opinion by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that (1) the Eighth Amendment
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution do not require the jury in a capital sentencing
proceeding to be instructed either on the concept of mitigat-
ing evidence generally or on particular statutory mitigating
factors; 23 and (2) no reasonable likelihood existed that the
jurors in the present case understood the instructions given
by the trial court to preclude their consideration of relevant
mitigating evidence.24 Thus, the decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was affirmed.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
Buchanan contended that "the trial court violated his
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from
arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty
when it failed to provide the jury with express guidance
on the concept of mitigation, and to instruct the jury on
particular statutorily defined mitigating factors: 25 In decid-
ing Buchanan's claim, the Court focused first on the con-
stitutionally required role of mitigation evidence in any
decision to impose the death penalty. Next, the Court focused
on whether the instruction given in the present case was such
"'The verdict form signed by the foreperson of the jury stat-
ed, in pre-printed type, that the jurors had "considered the evi-
dence in mitigation of the offense" and had nevertheless unani-
mously fixed Buchanan's punishment at death. Va. Code § 19.2-
264.4(D)(1) (1995).Although the majority of the Court found this
fact to be an indication that the jury had considered the mitigating
evidence, in reality this pre-printed form was probably the last
thing the jury looked at prior to informing the court of its deci-
sion.As Justice Breyer pointed out during the oral argument of this
case, by the time the foreperson of the jury read this statement on
the verdict form, the jury had already made its sentencing deci-
sion. See, Transcript of Oral Argument in Buchanan v.Angelone,
1997WL 695654 (U.S. OralArg. Nov. 3,1997).
"Buchanan, 118 S.Ct. at 760.
"Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389, 384 S.E.2d 757
(1989), cert. denied sub nom., Buchanan v. Virginia, 493 U.S.
1063 (1990).
"Buchanan v.Angelone, 103 E3d 344 (4th Cir. 1996).See also
Case Summary of Buchanan v.Angelone, Cap. Def.J.,Vol. 9, No. 2,
p.29.
'Buchanan v.Angelone, 103 E3d 344 (4th Cir. 1996), cert.
granted, 520 U.S. - (1997).
"Buchanan v.Angelone, 118 S.Ct. 757,763 (1998).
"Buchanan, 118 S.Ct. at 763.
21Id. at 761. In making its decision, the majority of the Court
focused on the latter aspect of Buchanan's claim regarding the fail-
ure to instruct on the statutory mitigating factors.The dissenters,
however, focused on the former aspect, the need to instruct on the
concept of mitigation generally.
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that there was no reasonable likelihood that the jurors under-
stood the instructions given by the trial court to preclude
their consideration of relevant mitigating evidence.
I. The Constitutional Role of Evidence in Mitigation
The penalty phase of every capital murder prosecution
is divided into two different aspects: the "eligibility phase"
and the "selection phase 26 During the eligibility phase in
Virginia, the Commonwealth has the burden of proving
either vileness or future dangerousness beyond a reasonable
doubt so that the jury may"narrow[ ] the class of defendants
eligible for the death penalty"27 If the prosecution carries its
burden in the eligibility phase, then the jury moves on to the
selection phase. In the selection phase, the jury considers
the aggravating evidence presented by the Commonwealth
and the mitigating evidence presented by the defense and,
after weighing this evidence, determines whether or not to
impose the death penalty.' Only the selection phase is at
issue in this case because it is only in the selection phase
that mitigating evidence has any relevance.
These two phases, according to the Court, are treated
differently under the Constitution. It is only in the eligibil-
ity phase, for instance, that the Court has "stressed the
need for channeling and limiting the jury's discretion to
ensure that the death penalty is a proportionate punish-
ment and therefore not arbitrary or capricious in its impo-
sition."29 In the selection phase, however, there needs to be
a "broad inquiry into all relevant mitigating evidence to
allow an individualized determination."3 In the selection
phase, the jury "may not be precluded from considering,
and may not refuse to consider, any constitutionally miti-
gating evidence."'
The States, however, are free to "shape and structure the
jury's consideration of mitigation so long as [they do] not
preclude the jury from giving effect to any relevant mitigating
evidence y3 2 Thus, a state may fashion jury instructions relevant
to the selection phase of a capital sentencing proceeding free
from any Court-imposed constitutionally required provisions.
3 3 If
subsequently challenged, the instructions are constitutionally
sufficient so long as there is not"'a reasonable likelihood that the
jury [ ] applied the challenged instruction in such a way that pre-
vents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence.""
261d. (citing Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967 (1994)).
"Id. See Va. Code § 19.2-264.4(A) (1995).
'Buchanan, 118 S.Ct. at 761.
211d.
101d. (citing Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 971-73; Romano v.
Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1994); &McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
279,304-306 (1987))
3'1d. (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 317-318 (1989);
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-114 (1982); & Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,604 (1978)).
2Buchanan, 118 S.Ct. at 761 (citing Johnson v. Texas, 509
U.S. 350,362 (1993);Penry, 492 U.S. at 326; & Franklin v.Lynaugh,
487 U.S. 164, 181 (1988)).
11. Was There a Reasonable Probability that the Jury
Applied the Virginia Pattern Instruction in a Such
a Way That It Was Prevented From Considering
Constitutionally Relevant Mitigating Evidence?
The Virginia Model Jury instruction given at Buchanan's
trial was not such that there was a"reasonable likelihood that
the jury [ I applied the challenged instruction in a way that
prevent[ed] the consideration of constitutionally relevant evi-
dence: 35 The Court based this determination on the fact that
within paragraph three of the instruction was the direction to
the jury to consider "all the evidence" in making its determi-
nation.' Thus, the Court reasoned, the instruction sufficiently
directed the jury to consider the mitigating evidence.37 This
Court, however, looked to one phrase in the entire instruc-
tion in order to conclude that the instruction was consti-
tutionally valid. 8 When read in its entirety, the instruction
is very confusing and seems to refer only to the evidence
relating to vileness. Paragraph two of the instruction refers
only to the aggravator. The first phrase of paragraph three,
"[i]f you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has
proved beyond a reasonable doubt the requirements of
[paragraph two], then you may fix the punishment of the
Defendant at death; likewise refers only to the aggravator.
Next comes the language keyed on by the majority:"or if you
3 Iis includes both a requirement that a State must instruct
on specific mitigating factors and a requirement that mitigation be
mentioned in some fashion in any of the instructions. This latter
point is an area in which the dissent and majority differ.The major-
ity opinion states in a footnote that Buchanan's claim that the
Virginia instruction should have at a bare minimum used the word
"mitigation" was waived due to his "belated attempt to adopt [it]
at oral argument." Id. at 762 n.4. In fact, this issue, and whether or
not it was waived, was the focus of the oral argument in this case.
The dissent discusses this issue and concludes that all the state
pattern instructions that the Court had heretofore permitted in
capital cases "explicitly mention the jury's consideration of miti-
gating evidence" and that the mention of mitigation in Virginia's
instruction would have made it much less constitutionally offen-
sive. Id. at 765 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
-Buchanan, 118 S.Ct. at 761 (quoting Boyde v. Calfornia, 494
U.S. 370, 380 (1990)). To this point, there is no significant dispute
between the majority opinion and the dissent.The majority opinion
clearly states the importance of mitigating evidence to a proper
imposition of the death penalty. It is in the application of the Boyde
test that the rift between the majority and dissent is apparent.
"Id. (quoting Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380).
1Id. at 762. See supra, note 12.
7 Id.
"'As a matter of both state and federal law, a reviewing court
must review the trial court's instructions as a whole and not in
artificial isolation. See e.g., Murpby v. Holland, 776 E2d 470 (4th
Cir. 1985), cert. granted, vacated, 475 U.S. 1138, on remand, 845
E2d 83, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (stating that a reviewing court
must review the trial court's instructions as a whole and not in
artificial isolation); United States v. Fleming, 739 E2d 945 (4th Cir.
1984) (same); Wright v. Commonwealth, 109 Va. 847, 65 S.E. 19
(1909) (same).
believe from all the evidence that the death penalty is not
justified, then you shall fix the punishment at life imprison-
ment! Paragraph four also refers only to the aggravator.This
juxtaposition of paragraphs and phrases, most of which refer
only to the aggravator, may lead to a potential misunder-
standing of the instruction. 9
The dissent reasoned that the instruction, when read
in its entirety as the jury would have received it, could rea-
sonably be read to say,"If you find the defendant eligible for
death, you may impose the death penalty, but if you find
(on the basis of 'all the evidence') that death penalty is not
'justified,' which is to say that the defendant is not eligible
for the death penalty, then you must impose life imprison-
ment 40 The dissent went on to say that "[wlithout any fur-
ther explanation, the jury might well believe that whether
death is, or is not, 'justified' turns on the presence or
absence of Paragraph 2's aggravating circumstances [ ]-
not upon the defendant's mitigating evidence ... 41
The majority concluded that even if the instruction was
deficient for not pointing out the existence of the mitigat-
ing evidence presented at trial, the jury was more than
aware of this evidence.The dissent stated, however, that"the
presentation of evidence does not tell the jury that the evi-
dence presented is relevant and can be taken into
"Buchanan, 118 S.Ct. at 764 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
41Id. (BreyerJ., dissenting).
11id. (BreyerJ., dissenting).
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account-particularly in the context of an instruction that
seems to exclude the evidence from the universe of rele-
vant considerations 42
After this case, defense counsel in Virginia should con-
tinue to object to the use of Virginia Model Criminal
Instruction 34.125 as vague, confusing, and insufficient to
adequately guide the discretion of the jury. If this objection
is overruled, counsel should insist that Virginia Model
Criminal Instruction 34.127, or a similar general mitigating
evidence instruction, be used as well. Virginia Model
Criminal Instruction 34.127 explicitly requires the jury to
consider "any evidence presented of circumstances which
do not justify or excuse the offense but which in fairness or
mercy may extenuate or reduce the degree of moral culpa-
bility and punishment . 3 Further, defense counsel should
continue requesting specific instructions on the statutory
mitigating factors relevant in their case. The Buchanan
Court only held that giving an instruction on mitigating evi-
dence is not constitutionally required.Trial judges, however,
are not prohibited from giving such instructions and may, in
their discretion, choose to do so in any case.
Summary and analysis by:
Brian S. Clarke
42
1d. at 766 (Breyerj., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
°Virginia Model Jury Instructions, Criminal, Instruction No.
34.127 (1993 & Supp. 1995) & Buchanan, 118 S.Ct. at 765-66
(BreyerJ., dissenting).
LAMBRIX v. SINGLETARY
117 S.Ct. 1517 (1997)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
Cary Michael Lambrix was convicted in Florida state
court on two counts of first-degree murder for the 1983
killing of a man and woman who, after meeting Lambrix
and his girlfriend at a local tavern, had returned to his trail-
er for dinner.' In the sentencing phase of the trial, the trial
court instructed the jury on five aggravating circum-
stances. 2 One such instruction involved the "especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel" (HAC) aggravator3 The jury
issued an advisory sentence of death for each count of mur-
der, and the trial court sentenced Lambrix to death on both
'Lambrix v. Singletary, 117 S.Ct. 1517,1521 (1997).
2Lambrix, 117 S.Ct. at 1524.
-Id. at 1521.
counts after finding five aggravating factors with respect to
the murder of one of the victims, four aggravating factors
with respect to the murder of the other victim, and no mit-
igating factors with respect to either murder. The Florida
Supreme Court upheld Lambrix's convictions and sen-
tences on direct appeal.
4
Lambrix made multiple attempts to obtain collateral
relief, all of which were subsequently denied. He next sought
a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida, which rejected all of his
claims. He appealed the decision to the United States Court of
Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.' While that appeal was pending, the
4Id.
'Id.
